On Belonging
Self’s Longing for The Other
Prologue:
Growing up as a Muslim in post-partition India, which Maulānā Āzād had described as an “unadulterated Hindu Raj”, I often had to endure considerable prejudice. While being called a “Pakistani” by my peers and facing their relentless ‘otherisation’, I often used to wonder “Do I really belong here?”. However, I asked the same question when I first came to the UK for higher education. Although the people here were more welcoming, I was nevertheless a traveller from a distant land with a different colour, accent, and culture. The idea of ‘belonging’, therefore, has always captivated me and the question “Where do I really belong?” has often made me lose all track of time. To learn more about this idea, I usually turn to the works of great thinkers who have thought about this idea far more deeply than I have. In the following essay, using the invaluable insights of such thinkers, I have attempted to describe what I have learnt about the idea of ‘belonging’.
سینه خواهم شرحه شرحه از فراق
I seek a heart, from longing torn apart
تا بگویم شرح درد اشتیاق
So the pain of yearning, I can impart
— Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rūmī [1]
The word ‘belong’ conveys the sense of ‘being along with’ or ‘being properly related to’ something [2]. And so the question “Where do I belong?” can be rephrased as “With what/whom can I be properly related to?”. Upon reflection, one can see that three distinct notions—that of the Self, the Other, and the ‘proper relationship between the two’—emerge out of this kernel of meaning. While the first two notions establish the I-Thou dichotomy, the last notion paves the way for ethical considerations which can potentially resolve this dichotomy.
Let us begin by first discussing the I-Thou dichotomy. To paraphrase Shaykh Al-Attās, [3] we are like “islands set in isolation within a fathomless sea enveloped by darkness”. Our “loneliness is so utterly absolute that we do not know even ourselves completely”. However, our lonely ‘Self’ gets mysteriously perturbed when it encounters an ‘Other’. When we gaze into the eyes of someone else, we recognise an elusive, yet familiar Other, gazing back at us. It is through this initial moment of encounter between the ‘I’ and a ‘non-I’, that the I-Thou dichotomy is born. The Other which gazes back at us, is simultaneously similar to and different from our Self. Perhaps, by somehow resolving this dichotomy of similarity and difference, the Self will be able to find its belongingness to the Other.
But why does this dichotomy need a resolution? In other words, why does this Self long to belong? In the opening verses of Masnavi-e-Ma’navi, Maulana Rumi paints the image of a reed-flute whose song laments and longs for the distant reed-bed from which it was once plucked. These verses are metaphorically describing the human condition. We are born and we find ourselves in a world of constant change and flux. Our family, friends, community, and indeed we too, undergo change. And yet, paradoxically, we intuit that something within us, this ‘I’ that we refer to our Self by, remains the same. This ‘I’, therefore, seems to be in this world, and yet, not of this world. Not completely being of this world, we cannot completely belong to this world; and hence, we long for the Beyond.
Levinas calls this longing of the Self for the Beyond, ‘the metaphysical desire’ [4]. Regular desires (desire for a drink, say) spring from a lack in the Self (thirst) and aim at a concrete Other (water), which when consumed satiates the Self. By contrast, the metaphysical desire neither springs from a sense of lack in the Self, nor does it aim at any discernible Other. According to Levinas, it aspires to an indiscernible ‘Absolute Other’ that is infinitely and completely other than our Self, and is so utterly out of our reach that we cannot possibly even relate to it in any way. However, the Other within our reach, i.e. the proximate Other (say, another human being), although not completely other than us, is still infinitely other than us. For Levinas, this infinite otherness of it with respect to us is an infinitesimal intimation of the Absolute Other and it is through the “face” of this proximate Other, that we can catch a glimpse of the Absolute Other.
But can a mere glimpse satisfy our metaphysical desire? And is this desire even satisfiable? According to Drew Dalton, the Absolute Other, which the metaphysical desire craves, lies “beyond the realm of Being.” [5] The metaphysical desire can therefore never be satisfied. Moreover, none of our regular desires that selfishly seek to consume the proximate Other, will suffice because the proximate Other is no substitute for the Absolute Other. Through this insatiability of our metaphysical desire, which makes selfish engagements with the proximate Other futile, Levinas ingeniously calls us to engage with the proximate Other, selflessly.
This Levinasian attempt to resolve the I-Thou dichotomy involves negation of the ‘I’. But is this self-negation even possible? For Levinas, the initial moment of encounter with the Other only leads to a recognition of difference. However, we know that the Other gazing back at us is similar to us, in at least some way. So this attempted Self-negation fails because the Other, although infinitely other than us, is not completely other than us. Some of our Self will linger within the Other, un-negated. As such, “the God of Levinas, which stands beyond even transcendence (since even transcendence implies a relation)”[6] whose “presence is felt only in absence”[6] fails to account for the presence of the Other—fails to ground an actual encounter with the Other.
In one of his works, [6] Shaykh Murad points to this failure of Levinas to resolve the I-Thou dichotomy. He says that “the I-Thou dichotomy can only be resolved by the third self” and that the God of Levinas, i.e. the Absolute Other, will not suffice. The non-existent Absolute Other needs to be replaced with the living God of Islamic Monotheism. The Levinasian “face” of the Other then becomes an infinitesimal intimation of God. The I-Thou pair can then be seen as pointing to The One (God) and the unity arising out of the complementarity of the pair resolves the pair’s dichotomy. As Shaykh Murad says, “The Other (God) calls us forth through the Other (creation)” [7] because “wherever you turn there is the face of God” [8].
Shaykh Murad’s insight shows that our insatiable longing is ultimately a longing for God, and that we can completely belong only to God. We can belong partially to an Other, only to the degree this Other points us to God. Moreover, it is only by ethically relating with others, that we can come to completely belong to God. As Shaykh Murad says:
“Ignore thyself and love The Other (God) through the Other (the creation).” [9]
References
[1] Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rūmī; Masnavi-e-Ma’navi, Book 1, Song of the reed, verses 5 & 6. These verses have been translated for persianpoetics.com by Muhammad Ali.
[2] Online Etymology Dictionary; www.etymonline.com/word/belong
[3] Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attās; Islām and Secularism, Chapter 3, pg. 81.
[4] Emmanuel Levinas; Totality and Infinity, Section I, Chapter A, pg. 33.
[5] Drew Dalton; The Vaccination of the Infinite: Levinas’ metaphysical desire and the Call of the Other.
[6] Abdal Hakim Murad; Commentary on the Eleventh Contentions, Contention 25.
[7] Abdal Hakim Murad; Contentions 4:88, masud.co.uk/contention/contentions-4/
[8] Qura’an; 2:115.
[9] Abdal Hakim Murad; Contentions 13:37, masud.co.uk/contention/contentions-13/