First of all, it’s great to have a philosophically minded muslim on here! The presence of people like you is severely lacking in English-language discourse online. Looking foward to seeing more!
My reading of Aristotle’s words agrees with yours in that he implies something anthropocentric, but I would argue that the man who is by nature without a state/city is not (necessarily) someone who has undergone a transformation, but rather one whose nature is an altered version of human nature, but doesn’t participate in human nature proper. It’s important to situate his claim in the broader argument for man being a political animal, which he essentially argues for from the fact that humans aren’t self-sufficient. I would argue that the “higher man” he refers to is a man who does not need a city, not because of a difference in material or spiritual needs, but because he can satisfy those needs by himself. His conception of the lower man is a man who is not able to satisfy those needs, but has needs similar to those of an animal, and thus does not need a city either. In my opinion, the two types of man are examples used to show that man is by nature an animal in need of a state. I don’t believe he claims that these two types of man exist, certainly not the “higher man”. Their very non-existence proves his argument, that man needs a state/city.
Thank you for the thoughtful engagement and kind words! Your point about situating this within Aristotle's broader argument about human political nature is well-taken, and the self-sufficiency angle certainly deserves consideration.
We both agree that essentially stateless 'man' possesses a nature distinct from man (taken ordinarily)—any coherent reading necessitates this. However, our interpretations diverge fundamentally on whether human nature, taken ordinarily, is static or dynamic. It seems to me that your reading treats essentially stateless man as a hypothetical categorically different entity, suggesting human nature is fixed and incapable of substantial change. My reading, conversely, proposes that these represent transformations all humans can undergo, in potency: a kind of ascent or decline.
The etymological evidence supports this dynamic interpretation. The Greek kreisson doesn't simply denote self-sufficiency but carries connotations of might, strength, and most crucially, excellence—terms that inherently suggest moral gradation and aspiration. Similarly, phaulos denotes degradation and wickedness. If these were simply logical constructs proving human political dependency, we might expect Aristotle to use morally neutral language. Instead, the moral implications embedded in these terms suggest we're meant to view them as ideals to aim toward (kreisson) and move away from (phaulos), rather than as hypothetical categories with no moral valence whatsoever.
Your interpretation, while philosophically coherent, seems to flatten this evaluative dimension by treating both extremes as equally non-existent. Even if the ideals of my reading are impossible to truly attain and human nature is static in Aristotelian metaphysics, which it may well be, and even if we are meant to view the 'higher man' as not having different material and spiritual needs or functions and instead, as you suggest, 'higher man' is simply a self-sufficient man, it seems to me that, from the words Aristotle chooses to use, this self-sufficiency is posited as a good to aim towards. And that is, essentially, the point I am trying to make. The Saint-vs-Possessed dichotomy is categorically Muslim or Abrahamic and I fully acknowledge that.
This doesn't negate your broader point about the passage demonstrating human political nature, but it does suggest these categories might be more than mere thought experiments—they could represent actual modes of being that illuminate the spectrum of human possibility.
First of all, it’s great to have a philosophically minded muslim on here! The presence of people like you is severely lacking in English-language discourse online. Looking foward to seeing more!
My reading of Aristotle’s words agrees with yours in that he implies something anthropocentric, but I would argue that the man who is by nature without a state/city is not (necessarily) someone who has undergone a transformation, but rather one whose nature is an altered version of human nature, but doesn’t participate in human nature proper. It’s important to situate his claim in the broader argument for man being a political animal, which he essentially argues for from the fact that humans aren’t self-sufficient. I would argue that the “higher man” he refers to is a man who does not need a city, not because of a difference in material or spiritual needs, but because he can satisfy those needs by himself. His conception of the lower man is a man who is not able to satisfy those needs, but has needs similar to those of an animal, and thus does not need a city either. In my opinion, the two types of man are examples used to show that man is by nature an animal in need of a state. I don’t believe he claims that these two types of man exist, certainly not the “higher man”. Their very non-existence proves his argument, that man needs a state/city.
Thank you for the thoughtful engagement and kind words! Your point about situating this within Aristotle's broader argument about human political nature is well-taken, and the self-sufficiency angle certainly deserves consideration.
We both agree that essentially stateless 'man' possesses a nature distinct from man (taken ordinarily)—any coherent reading necessitates this. However, our interpretations diverge fundamentally on whether human nature, taken ordinarily, is static or dynamic. It seems to me that your reading treats essentially stateless man as a hypothetical categorically different entity, suggesting human nature is fixed and incapable of substantial change. My reading, conversely, proposes that these represent transformations all humans can undergo, in potency: a kind of ascent or decline.
The etymological evidence supports this dynamic interpretation. The Greek kreisson doesn't simply denote self-sufficiency but carries connotations of might, strength, and most crucially, excellence—terms that inherently suggest moral gradation and aspiration. Similarly, phaulos denotes degradation and wickedness. If these were simply logical constructs proving human political dependency, we might expect Aristotle to use morally neutral language. Instead, the moral implications embedded in these terms suggest we're meant to view them as ideals to aim toward (kreisson) and move away from (phaulos), rather than as hypothetical categories with no moral valence whatsoever.
Your interpretation, while philosophically coherent, seems to flatten this evaluative dimension by treating both extremes as equally non-existent. Even if the ideals of my reading are impossible to truly attain and human nature is static in Aristotelian metaphysics, which it may well be, and even if we are meant to view the 'higher man' as not having different material and spiritual needs or functions and instead, as you suggest, 'higher man' is simply a self-sufficient man, it seems to me that, from the words Aristotle chooses to use, this self-sufficiency is posited as a good to aim towards. And that is, essentially, the point I am trying to make. The Saint-vs-Possessed dichotomy is categorically Muslim or Abrahamic and I fully acknowledge that.
This doesn't negate your broader point about the passage demonstrating human political nature, but it does suggest these categories might be more than mere thought experiments—they could represent actual modes of being that illuminate the spectrum of human possibility.